The "upstairs market"
Recent research by Kumar Venkataraman,
finance professor at SMU's Cox School of
Business, and Hendrik Bessembinder offers
insight and evidence into new possibilities and
difficult issues facing stock exchanges. In
“Does an electronic stock exchange need an
upstairs market?” from the July,
2003 issue of Journal of Financial Economics,
the authors find that a large proportion of
institutional trading in electronic exchanges is
executed away from the
centralized book in the informal 'upstairs
market', thus presenting new challenges.
Despite the efficiencies of computerized
markets, virtually every stock market is
accompanied by a parallel "upstairs" market,
where larger traders employ the services of
brokerage firms to locate counterparties and
negotiate trade terms. Upstairs markets are
based on relationships. Rather than submitting
an electronic order to effortlessly attract
counterparties, the upstairs brokers seek out
counterparties (from traders known to them who
might be interested). They then negotiate
transactions that might otherwise be executed at
an inordinate cost or delay. An electronic
trading system lowers the fixed costs of trading
for relatively liquid stocks in block sizes not
likely to overwhelm the current market. However,
it does not allow for the informal exchange of
information (?) that is important for certain
types of large trades and for illiquid stocks.
In electronic markets,
traders don’t get a sense of who they’re
trading with, how much more the other party is
trading, etc., and that information can be very
important to some traders. Large (institutional)
traders therefore seek other trading venues such
as the 'upstairs market' to lower the risk of
exposing their order positions, to ensure
symmetric transfer of information, and to retain
some of the give and take of the old
open outcry market. Approximately 70% of
block-size trade transactions are executed in
the upstairs market in Paris.
The Paris Bourse provides an excellent
illustration of the use of upstairs
intermediation markets, because its
electronic limit order market closely
resembles the downstairs (electronic) markets
envisioned by theorists. The best evidence from
the Paris Bourse is that:
-
Upstairs brokers lower the risk of
adverse selection by "certifying" block
orders as uninformed (i.e., as not having
access to nonpublic information).
-
Upstairs brokers are able to tap into
pools of hidden or unexpressed liquidity
(they frequently 'go looking' for buyers or
sellers not currently in the market).
-
Traders strategically choose across the
upstairs and downstairs markets to minimize
expected execution costs (including
slippage, etc.).
-
Trades are more likely to be routed
upstairs if they are large or are in stocks
with low overall trading activity.
The second result is the most novel and
arguably the most important. The upstairs broker
completes transactions by searching for
institutional investors who may be interested in
the stock, but who have not as yet formally
expressed their trading intentions. It is
documented that executions costs of transactions
completed by the upstairs broker average only
35% of what they would have paid if completed
against limit orders in the centralized
electronic exchange, suggesting that trading
relationship and the informal exchange of
information between upstairs brokers and
institutional traders helps lower execution
costs. One major challenge facing electronic
markets is the lack of a comparable mechanism of
certification of traders and information
exchange.
The
Euronext market allows large transactions in
some stocks to be executed outside the quotes.
Such outside-the-quote transactions are not
permitted in United States markets. For eligible
stocks in Paris, market participants agree to
outside-the-quote execution mainly for more
difficult trades and at times when downstairs
liquidity is lacking. These likely represent
trades that probably could not have been
otherwise completed, suggesting that market
quality can be enhanced by allowing participants
more flexibility to execute blocks at prices
outside the quotes. These findings are
particularly relevant to U.S. markets because
quoted spreads and depths have decreased
substantially in the wake of decimalization.
The upstairs market in the
Paris Bourse completes two-thirds of block
trading volume, compared with 20% on the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE). A likely explanation
is that the NYSE floor allows large traders to
execute customized strategies through a floor
broker, while avoiding the risks of order
exposure. If orders submitted to electronic
markets do not allow block initiators to limit
order exposure and trade strategically, then
order flow is likely to migrate to alternative
trading venues such as the upstairs market. If
you’re a liquidity trader, you don’t want the
system to be anonymous. If you’re an informed
trader you like anonymity because you can hide
in the order flow.
To compete with broker-intermediated markets,
the next generation of electronic trading
systems needs to include features that better
meet the needs of large traders, particularly
the lack of anonymity. To allow large investors
to manage order exposure in an electronic
exchange, a wider range of order types that
include state contingent exposure and execution
algorithms need to be made available. The NYSE’s
recently introduced “Conversion and Parity” (CAP)
orders which are intended to be “smart” orders
for large lots of stocks that are executed
gradually through the day, contingent on market
conditions, are a step in this direction.
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